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In The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THERAL V. BISHOP and
ROSS L. COVINGTON,
Respondents.

Case No. 10054

Brief of Petitioner
NATURE OF CASE
Action by petitioner commenced in this Court for an
Extraordinary Writ in the nature of quo warranto against
respondents asserting and alleging that respondents as
Mayor and Commissioner respectively have no right to
hold said respective offices, but are usurpers.
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT TO SUPREME COURT
This is an orginal action to this Court and has never
been passed upon or tried in a lower court.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner seeks the ouster of said respondents from
their respective offices of Mayor and Commissioner of
Logan City, Utah.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 7th day of November, '1961, at Logan City,
Utah an election was duly held for the office of Mayor
and one City Commissioner for a term of four years from
January 2, 1962; that at said election, Respondent Theral
V. Bishop was elected Mayor of Logan City and Respondent Ross L. Covington was elected Commissioner of Logan
City; that on the 2nd day of January, 1962, the said duly
elected officers duly qualified by taking their oaths of office and have since said time continued to act as officers
in those respective capacities as ~1ayor and Commissioner
of said City; that Logan City by virtue of the laws of Utah
is a second class city.
Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 18 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, reads as follows: "Election expenses to be published - Penalty - Every elective officer in a city of the first and
second class shall within thirty days after qualifying file
with the city recorder and publish at least once in a daily
newspaper of general circulation in the city a sworn statement of all his election expenses, showing by whom such
funds were contributed. In case any such elective officer
fails to publish such statement his office becomes vacant,
and such officer in addition thereto shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."
It is admitted that the said respondents did not publish within the required 30 days after duly qualifying, but
did make an attempt about 154 days after their qualification- on June 7, 1962, to comply with said statute, a copy
of which is set out in Amendment to Petition for Extraordinary Writ; that there was no other filing or publishing
than that of June 7, 1962.
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That petitioner, prior to the commencement of action
in this Court, had notified the Attorney General of this
State of the failure of respondents to comply with the here
quoted statute, but said Attorney General on the 3rd day
of April, 1963, gave his answer and refused to act as will
he observed from exhibits A, B, C, D, and E, which exhibits were made part of the Petition for an Extraordinary
Writ and which shows permission was given by Attorney
General to petitioner to file this suit. That said petition
was placed before this Court on the 9th day of January,
1964, and since said time has been filed with the Clerk of
this Court as well as a cost and damage bond. That thereafter the respondents made a Motion to Dismiss and Answered the Petition. To this Motion, petitioner filed areply opposing said motion and replying to said answer.
On the 18th day of February, 1964, a hearing was
held on this matter and after duly considering this matter,
this Court granted an Alternative Writ and ordered petitioner and respondents to file printed briefs.
ARGUMENT

1
THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AS AMENDED ARE
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PETITIONER HAS SUFFICIENT INTEREST AND THAT HE MAY BRING ACTION IN HIS OWN NAME BY VIRTUE OF 65B (d)
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
\Vhile the overall question is whether petitioner has
stated a good cause of action for the relief sought, it seems
to us that it might for the sake of clear discussion to divide
5
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that question up and treat it under separate headings and
we have so done. So we proceed now under number 1.
It will be noted that the petition as Amended alleges
that petitioner is a citizen, a resident, a qualified voter,
a property owner and taxpayer in Logan City, Utah.

In the case of Norton v. People ( 1938) 102 Colo. 48'9
81 P. ( 2) 393, in a quo warranto proceedings where
pertinent statutes were silent, as in our statute, as to the
qualifications of a relator, it was held that in a proceeding
testing the sufficiency of the incorporation of a town and
as a result the validity of the holding of certain muicipal
offices by the respondents, the relator's interest was sufficient, against a claim that he was neither a resident nor
a taxpayer of the muicipality in question, where the facts
showed that he had leased and operated a filling station
for a number of years, and subsequently purchased the
same, though title to the land was taken in the name of his
wife rather than himself, and the fact that his residence
was not in the muncipality was immaterial. The court
remarked that a slight interest was sufficient to permit
an individual to qualify as relator in a quo warranto action.
The statute authorizing without limitation on its face
the bringing of a quo warranto action in the name of the
state by a private person on his own complaint when the
attorney general refused to act, in order to oust an alleged
usurper of public office was held in State ex rei. Martin
v. Ekern ( 1938) 228 Wis 645, 280 NW 393, to have validated the bringing of such action by a private relator against
the alleged usurper of the office of lieutenant governor of
the state, where it was shown that the attorney general had
been requested by the relator to bring the action, but had
declined to do so. And in the case of State ex rei. Williams
6
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v Samuelson ( 1907) 131 Wis 499, 111 N\V 712, a private

pt·rson was held to have the right to bring his own complaint in quo warranto proceedings where he was shown
to be a taxpayer. To the same effect is State ex rei. Waterbury v ~lartin ( 1878) 46 Conn 479 and the case of Huff
v .Amkrson ( 1955) 212 Ga 32, 90 SE 2d. 329, and also the
casl' of Whitehurst v. Jones (1903) 117 Ga 803,45 SE 49.
:\nd it will be further noted in the case of State ex rei.
Pooser v Wister 170 So. 736, "that it is enough that he is
a citizen and having the law upheld, but this, like all other
rules of law, has its limitations."
Petitioner submits that he may bring this action in his
own name under 65 B (d) of the Rules of Civil Proceedure
which reads as follows:
"Action hy Private Person Under Subdivision (1) of this
Rule." "A person claiming to be entitled to a public or
private office unlawfully held and exercised by another
may bring an action therefor. A private person may
bring ~m action upon any other ground set forth in subdivision (b) 1 of this rule) only if the Attorney General
fails to do so after notice. Any such action commenced
by a private person shall be brought in his own name."

We believe that the cases here cited and 65 B (d) of
the Rules of Civil Proceedure here quoted are suficient
to show that petitioner has sufficient interest and that he
is a proper party in bringing this action. And that the
cases cited and 65 B (d) here cited are a complete reply to
respondents Motion to Dismiss on this phase of the case.
And we believe that when the Attorney General refused to
proceed, petitioner had the same authority to proceed and
with the same effect as if the Attorney General had taken
over upon request.
In some of these cases a private relator did not even
han' to bring action in his own name, but could and did

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bring it in the name of the state. Our statute, in this regard, says that a private individual shall bring it in his
own name. And it is most interesting to note under Subdivision (b) 1 of this rule, there is a comment by the compiler of the 1953 Utah Code Annotated. Vol. 9 page 733
and at top thereof which reads as follows: "Under the
above subdivision a private person may commence the action where the attorney-general fails so to do after notice."
II

PETITIONER HAS NO ADEQUATE AND SPEEDY
REMEDY IN THE COURSE OF THE LAW AND
THEREFORE HE NEED NOT INITIALLY APPLY TO
A LOWER COURT FOR RELIEF, BUT MAY ORIGINALLY BRING ACTION TO THE SUPRE~1E COURT.
We believe a sufficient affirmation of this phase of
the case lies in paragraph 7 of petition for an extraordinary
writ which alleges that the said question herein involved
is one that should be determined in the first instance by
this Court in the interest of speedy justice, inasmuch as
respondents are unlawfully usurping, holding, exercising,
and intruding themselves into public offices of the state.
The necessary delay in first applying to the lower court
and a review of its decision by appeal would be such as to
render the remedy essentially useless.

III
SECTION 18 OF TITLE 10 CHAPTER 6 OF 1953
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS MANDATORY AND
NOT MERELY DIRECTORY AND THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO COMPLY THEREWITH, AND
THEIR OFFICES BECAME VACANT.
Petitioner submits that this statute is mandatory and
8
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not merely directory for the said section recites that failure to file and publish such a statement within 30 days after the taking oath, his office becomes vacant, and such
officer in addition thereto shall be guilty of a misdomean(.'f.

In Southerlands Statutory Construction 3 Edition,
Chapter 58, Vol. 3, page 76, it is observed: "Where the
langt•age of the statute is clear and unambiguous the
Courts may hold that the construction is obvious from the
lanunage used."
0'

~

5'

In Tuthell v. Aendleiman ~ N.E. (2) 375, the court

said that the general rule in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory or advisory was as follows:
where the terms of the statute are preemtory and exclusive,
where no discretion is reposed or where penalties are provided for its violation, the provisions of the act must be regarded as mandatory. To the same effect is Hudgins v.
~lorresville Consolidated School District 278 S.W. 769
( 1925) and it was held in the case of Annehick v. Transamerican Freight Lines, D.C. Mich. 46 F. Supp. 861, 866,
that an employer's violation respecting minimum compensation for overtime work by an employee was "mandatory"
and neither ignorance of the employer nor his good intentions were a defense against the penalty.
In our own state in the case of State v. Christensen.
8-! Ut. 185, 35 P ( 2) 775, this Court held that when Mr.
Stein failed to qualify within 60 days as the statute required the office became vacant. That the statute was
mandatory and self-executing. And in the case Oda v.
Elk Grove Union Grammar School District 143 P (2)
490,492, the Court held that where performance of a statutory requirements is mandatory, there can be no "substan9
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tial compliance" with the statute, except in accordance
with the particular provisions.
It is stated in Am. Jur. Vol. 11, Sec 74 pp. 699 that
"one of the recognized rules in a constitutional provision
is not self-executing when it merely lays down general
principles, but that it is self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right which it grants
may be enjoyed and protected, or a duty which it imposes
may be enforced without a legislative enactment."

Respondents did not make an attempt to comply with
the statute here involved until June 7,1962, approximately
154 days after they took their oaths of office. And as
pointed out in petitioners type written brief heretofore
subitted, respondents even then did not comply substantially with the requirements of the said statute not only in
point of time, but in point of substance or matters that are
required under said 10-6-18. Therefore there was no substantial compliance as claimed by respondents through
their counsel, Mr. George D. Preston, either in point of
time or substance.
IV.
THAT SAID SECTION 18 OF TITLE 10 CHAPTER
6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 HAS NEVER BEEN
REPEALED.
Perhaps respondents will again claim that this law has
been repealed by Chapter 14, Sections 1 to 47 inclusive
and particularly Sections 20-14-9 to 20-14-14.
There is no incompatibility in those Acts and 10-6-18
even by implication. We believe that the repeal of a law
is never indulged in unless it is clearly shown that there is
such an incompatibility that one must necessarily fall. And
10
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it must be further remembered that 10-6-18 has nothing

whatever to do with before elections. It only comes into
play after officers have fully qualified as Mr. Bishop and
\lr. Covington evidently did, and only then. The Corrupt Practice Act so far as filing election expenses is concerned, applies only before the elected parties take oath,
wlwrease 10-6-18 not only says they must file after qualifying. but in addition thereto must publish in a newspaper
of general circulation within the city within 30 days after
qualifications and failing to publish, a vacancy exists.
There is nothing in the Corrupt Practice Act which says
anything about publication.
On this phase of the 1~~ petitiner can do no better
than cite 50 Am. Jur. pp. ~'Sec.~ and following section. In these sections it is said that repeal by implication is not favored and that if two constructions are possible the one will be adopted to support the earlier act,
rather than to repeal it by implication.
CONCLUSION
That the public has a vital interest in this matter is beyond dispute.
There was submitted to this Court typewritten briefs
before the hearing on the 18th day of February, 1964, by
petitioner. We would, if possible, incorporate these
briefs as part of this printed brief for the Court's consideration.
It is respectfully submitted that the undisputed facts
and the law applicable to those facts compel the ouster of
respondents, as Mayor and Commissioner of Logan City.

'Ye therefore respectfully submit and request that a
11
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I

Judgment and Writ should issue out of this Court ousting,~
said respondents from their respective offices as Mayor .~
and Commissioner of Logan City, Utah.
1
'I

Dated this 17th day of March, 1964.
Respectfully submitted,
Harvey A. Sjostrom
375 West Center Street,
Logan, Utah
Attorney for petitioner.
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